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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court had original jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court subsequently assigned this case 
to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4) by Order dated 
May 27, 2010. The Utah Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 
the Utah Supreme Court's assignment and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in striking Plaintiffs untimely 
designation of fact and expert witnesses? 
a. Standard of Review: Utah appellate courts review a trial court's ruling on a 
motion to strike under an abuse of discretion standard. Posner v. Equity 
Title Ins. Agency, Inc., 2009 UT App 347, f 23, 222 P.3d 775; Daniels v. 
Gamma West Br achy therapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, \ 54, 221 P.3d 256. 
b. Preservation of Issue: Defendant preserved this issue in its Motion to Strike 
(R. at 372-73), Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike (R. at 374-77), 
and Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike (R. at 405-09). 
Did the trial court err in granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment? 
a. Standard of Review: Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgments present for review 
conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not 
resolve factual issues. Thus, [this Court] accord[s] no deference to the trial 
court, but review[s] its conclusions for correctness." McNair v. Farris, 944 
P.2d 392, 394 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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b. Preservation of Issue: Defendant preserved this issue in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. at 288-89), Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. at 290-349), Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 378-85), and the trial court's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order on Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike (R. at 428-31). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND 
REGULATIONS 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)(A) 
A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any 
person who may be used at trial to present evidence under 
Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 37(a)(2)(A) 
If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), 
any other party may move to compel disclosure and for 
appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a 
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or 
attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure 
in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 37(f) 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other 
material as required by Rule 26(a) . . . that party shall not be 
permitted to use the witness, document or other material at 
any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the 
party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition 
to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take 
any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of a motor vehicle collision between the parties that occurred 
on or about July 18, 2003. Plaintiff claims to have sustained various injuries and 
damages in the subject accident. Defendant claims that the accident was not his fault. 
After several years of litigation and several scheduling orders, and after all discovery 
deadlines had passed, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based on 
Plaintiffs failure to designate fact and expert witnesses. In response, Plaintiff filed 
untimely designations of fact and expert witnesses, prompting Defendant to file a Motion 
to Strike those untimely designations. The trial court granted the Motion to Strike and 
the Motion for Summary Judgment, and this appeal ensued. 
Facts and Procedural Details 
On or about July 18, 2003 at a relatively short time past midnight, Plaintiff was 
traveling northbound on 2300 East in Salt Lake City, Utah, as a passenger in a vehicle 
driven by Whitney Isaacson. (R. at 2.) At around the same time, Defendant was 
operating a vehicle southbound on 2300 East. (R. at 2.) When both parties arrived at the 
intersection of 2300 East and 3300 South, the vehicle in which Plaintiff was a passenger 
turned left (westward) in front of Defendant's vehicle, resulting in a collision. (R. at 2.) 
As a result of this accident, Plaintiff claims to have sustained injuries to her neck, 
back, right wrist, right foot, and experienced headaches and migraines. (R. at 292, 321-
22.) Plaintiff treated with approximately twelve different medical providers, including a 
massage therapist, physical therapist, several medical doctors, a doctor of osteopathic 
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medicine, a chiropractor, and an acupuncturist. (R. at 293, 323-24.) Plaintiff also claims 
to have required right wrist surgery, despite the fact that her first complaints of right wrist 
pain occurred approximately seventeen months after the subject accident. (P.. at 293-94, 
348.) However, causation of Plaintiff s medical complaints were complicated by a 
previous motor vehicle accident (R. at 342) where she complained of pain to her neck, 
low back, in between her shoulders, shoulders, arms, hands, hips, legs, knees, feet, and 
chest, and also complained of headaches, dizziness, and nervousness/depression (R. at 
345-46). Plaintiff had also hit her head on three separate occasions prior to the subject 
accident which caused her to lose consciousness each time. (R. at 338.) 
Plaintiff filed her Complaint in this matter on or about September 22, 2005. (R. at 
1-7.) On or about January 27, 2006, the trial court entered an Order approving the case 
management order submitted by both parties. (R. at 22.) This Order required Plaintiff to 
designate expert witnesses by May 24, 2006. (R. at 20.) Just days before this deadline, 
by stipulation of the parties and Order of the court, the time was extended for Plaintiff to 
designate expert witnesses until October 1, 2006. (R. at 36.) The parties subsequently 
conducted depositions of the named parties and witnesses, the last of which occurred on 
March 21, 2007. (R. at 114.) For the next twelve months, Defendant's counsel sent 
Plaintiffs counsel four separate letters requesting the return of signed medical releases 
from the Plaintiff so that Defendant could obtain the relevant medical records, and 
Plaintiff failed to respond to each of these four letters. (R. at 114-15, 129-138.) In fact, 
despite these several attempts, Defendant's counsel had absolutely no actual 
communication or contact with Plaintiffs counsel for one year. (R. at 114-15.) 
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On February 27, 2008, the trial court scheduled an order to show cause hearing to 
be held on April 30, 2008 to determine whether this case should be dismissed for failure 
to prosecute. (R. at 103). Coincidentally, three weeks later on March 20, 2008, 
Plaintiffs counsel finally contacted Defendant's counsel's office wishing to respond to 
the request for medical releases. (R. at 115.) On that same day, Defendant's counsel 
wrote a letter to Plaintiffs counsel in response and made the following statement: "I find 
it troubling that it took the court's notice of the order to show cause to get you to respond 
to our numerous attempts to proceed with discovery in this matter." (R. at 145.) Later 
that same afternoon, counsel for the parties conducted a telephone conference to discuss 
the medical releases and an independent medical examination. (R. at 116.) During that 
conversation, Plaintiffs counsel stated that he wanted these issues resolved prior to "next 
week's hearing." (Id.) Defense counsel then informed Plaintiffs counsel that the Order 
to Show Cause hearing was not scheduled for "next week," but that it was scheduled for 
"next month," referring to the April 30, 2008 hearing. (Id) 
Despite the letter and the telephone conference, neither Plaintiff nor her counsel 
appeared at the order to show cause hearing, prompting the trial court to dismiss the case 
without prejudice. (R. at 163-64.) However, five and one-half months later, on October 
16, 2008, the trial court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Dismissal based on the 
finding that Plaintiffs counsel had suffered a life-threatening health condition which 
precipitated events which led to the failure to docket the order to show cause hearing in 
Plaintiffs counsel's calendaring system. (R. at 197-200.) In doing so, the trial court 
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ordered: "Counsel and parties should govern themselves accordingly, and move this case 
forward expeditiously without delay." (R. at 199.) 
The trial court subsequently entered a new case management order which required 
Plaintiff to designate expert witnesses by May 15, 2009 and fact witnesses by June 5, 
2009. (R. at 205.) Once again, Plaintiff failed to designate any fact or expert witnesses, 
and based on such failure, Defendant filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on 
September 14, 2009. (R. at 288-89.) One month later, in response to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff filed her designation of fact and expert 
witnesses. (R. at 359-60.) Defendant then filed a Motion to Strike the untimely 
designations and supporting memoranda. (R. at 372-77, 405-09.) The trial court 
subsequently granted Defendant's Motion to Strike, and because Plaintiff had no expert 
witnesses to present at trial, granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based 
on Plaintiffs inability to establish causation of her injuries or the reasonableness and 
necessity of her medical treatment. (R. at 428-31.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I 
The trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in striking Plaintiffs untimely 
designation of fact and expert witnesses. Plaintiff had three separate opportunities to 
designate fact and expert witnesses, and failed to do so. Utah appellate courts have long 
upheld trial court rulings excluding expert witnesses based on the presenting party's 
failure to disclose such experts pursuant to rule 26(a)(3). A failure to disclose fact and 
expert witnesses subjects an offending party to sanctions under rule 37(f), which prevents 
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a party from using a witness at any hearing unless the failure to disclose was harmless or 
a party has good cause for the failure. Here, Plaintiffs failure to disclose resulted in 
prejudice to Defendant by inhibiting his ability to defend against Plaintiffs claims based 
on the close of discovery, the length of time that had elapsed since commencement of the 
litigation, and the effect of the passage of time on witnesses' memories, and the loss of 
the ability to obtain rebuttal experts and depose witnesses that had not been disclosed. 
Additionally, Plaintiff offered no good cause for the failure to designate fact and expert 
witnesses. Thus, the trial court was well within its broad discretion in striking Plaintiffs 
untimely designation of fact and expert witnesses. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to present any argument that supports her 
contention that the trial court abused its broad discretion. Plaintiff erroneously claims 
that Defendant failed to comply with rule 37(a)(2)(A) by not conferring with Plaintiff 
prior to seeking a discovery sanction under rule 37(f). Defendant did not file a motion to 
compel, and was therefore relieved of any requirement to confer with Plaintiff prior to 
seeking an order striking the untimely witness designations. Secondly, the mere fact that 
Defendant had obtained Plaintiffs medical records did not alleviate Plaintiff from 
complying with rule 26(a)(3). Therefore, the trial court properly exercised its broad 
discretion in striking Plaintiffs untimely designation of fact and expert witnesses. 
II 
The trial court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
There are two primary bases supporting the trial court's decision. First, without expert 
medical testimony, Plaintiff could not establish the element of causation of her 
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negligence claim. The injuries she complains of fall outside the common knowledge of a 
layperson, requiring expert medical testimony. Plaintiff also has not established that her 
experience as an EMT qualified her to do anything other than recognize and stabilize 
traumatic injuries—qualifications that fall far short of the standard necessary to prove 
causation. Even Dr. Chung's opinions would not have been available to Plaintiff because 
there would have been no need to call Dr. Chung as a witness for the defense, and 
Plaintiff did not designate Dr. Chung as her own expert. 
Second, without expert testimony, Plaintiff could not establish the element of 
damages of her negligence claim. Even if Plaintiff were somehow allowed to testify that 
her claimed injuries arose from this accident, her training as an EMT would not have 
qualified her to testify as to the reasonableness and necessity of her extensive medical 
treatment, ranging from massage therapy to acupuncture, which also included a wrist 
surgery. Plaintiff has presented no evidence of the reasonableness of these treatments. 
Additionally, there are numerous factors which complicated Plaintiffs claim of damages, 
including a prior motor vehicle accident which resulted in similar complaints, a gap in 
treatment of approximately seventeen months related to Plaintiffs wrist surgery, and 
other prior trauma that resulted in three separate occasions where Plaintiff lost 
consciousness. These complicating factors would require a jury to speculate as to the 
reasonableness and necessity of complex medical treatment. Therefore, the trial court 
properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment based on Plaintiffs failure 
to establish her damages through admissible evidence. 
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ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN 
STRIKING PLAINTIFF'S UNTIMELY DESIGNATION OF FACT AND 
EXPERT WITNESSES, 
It is well settled under Utah law that trial courts have broad discretion in the 
management of cases before them. Preston & Chambers, B.C. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 
262 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 
293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This broad discretion includes determining discovery 
sanctions "because trial courts must deal first hand with the parties and the discovery 
process." Glacier Land Co., L.L.C. v. Claudia Klawe & Assocs., L.L.C, 2006 UT App 
516, t 35, 154 P.3d 852 (quoting Hales v. Oldroyd, 2000 UT App 75, \ 15, 999 P.2d 
588). Additionally, pursuant to rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, trial courts 
have broad discretion in "selecting and imposing sanctions for discovery violations. . . . " 
Roller, 943 P.2d at 262 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 37 and Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 
938 P.2d 271, 273-75 (Utah 1997)). 
In this case, Plaintiff had the opportunity to designate expert witnesses on three 
separate occasions as ordered by the trial court—May 24, 2006, October 1, 2006, and 
May 15, 2009—but failed to do so. (R. at 20, 36, and 205.) The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure required Plaintiff to disclose expert witnesses, reports, substance of facts and 
opinions, summary of grounds for each opinion, qualifications of the expert, a list of 
publications authored by the expert within the last ten years, the compensation to be paid 
for the testimony, and a listing of cases to which the expert previously testified. See Utah 
n 
R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B). Rule 37 addresses the consequences of Plaintiff s failure and 
states in pertinent part: 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other 
material as required by Rule 26(a) . . . that party shall not be 
permitted to use the witness, document or other material at 
any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the 
party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition 
to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take 
any action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f). 
Here, the trial court specifically found that Plaintiff had not provided 1he court 
with any good or just cause for the failure to designate fact and expert witnesses by the 
three previous deadlines. (R. at 429.) The trial court also found that Defendant was 
prejudiced by Plaintiffs failure to designate any witnesses by not having the opportunity 
to depose the untimely designated witnesses, by the long passage of time, and because 
witnesses' memories fade over time, each of which impaired Defendant's ability to 
defend against Plaintiffs claims. (R. at 430.) These findings were also made with an 
understanding of the procedural history of this case.1 In light of these findings, the trial 
court exercised its broad discretion and struck Plaintiffs untimely designation of fact and 
expert witnesses. In response, Plaintiff argues two points: (A) that Defendant failed to 
confer with Plaintiff prior to seeking sanctions under rule 37, and (B) that Defendant 
already had records from Plaintiffs untimely designated expert, Hansen D.C. 
(Appellant's Br. 12-14.) Each of these arguments lacks merit. 
1
 This case was previously dismissed based on Plaintiffs failure to appear at an order to show cause hearing 
referenced in the "Facts" section of Appellee's Brief. Despite a letter from Defendant's counsel and a telephone 
conference explaining that the trial court had scheduled the order to show cause hearing, the trial court exercised its 
broad discretion in setting aside the dismissal of this case and giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt. 
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A. Plaintiff Erroneously Concludes That Defendant Was Required to 
Comply With Rule 37(a)(2)(A) Prior to Filing a Motion to Strike. 
Plaintiff cites to Rule 37(a)(2)(A) for the proposition that Defendant was required 
to confer in good faith with Plaintiff prior to moving the trial court for an order striking 
Plaintiffs untimely fact and expert witness designations. (Appellant's Br. 12-14.) 
However, Rule 37(a)(2)(A) does not apply to this case. This rule states: 
If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), 
any other party may move to compel disclosure and for 
appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a 
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or 
attempted to confer with the party not making the disclosure 
in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In this case, Defendant never filed a 
motion to compel, and therefore did not have to meet the requirements of this rule. See 
Rukavina v. Sprague, 2007 UT App 331,1 8, 170 P.3d 1138 ("[S]ubsection (f) of rule 37 
is independent of the motion to compel procedure outlined in rule 37(a)."). Plaintiff 
misconstrues the scope of rule 37(a)(2)(A) and asks this Court to improperly apply it to 
Defendant's Motion to Strike. 
Importantly, this Court has previously addressed and upheld trial court rulings 
striking expert witnesses based on a party's failure to disclose such experts pursuant to 
rule 26 as a discovery sanction without inquiry as to whether the parties conferred in 
good faith. See Johnson v. Gold's Gym, 2009 UT App 76, Tfij 13-14, 206 P.3d 302 
(upholding trial court's ruling striking plaintiffs expert witness for failure to disclose 
expert report); Rukavina, 2007 UT App 331 at \ 8 (recognizing a trial court's discretion 
in excluding evidence or imposing sanctions under rule 37for failure to comply with rule 
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26(a)); Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, fflf 11,18, 141 P.3d 629 (holding that trial 
court did not abuse its broad discretion in striking affidavit of expert who had not been 
disclosed and had not provided a report). Indeed, "[tjhere is nothing in this provision 
mandating that a motion to compel and subsequent court order granting such a motion be 
prerequisites for the sanctions specified in rule 37(f)." Rukavina, 2007 UT App 331 at Tf 
8. As in this case, "[Plaintiffs] attorney's failure to abide by the trial court's discovery 
orders provide[s] ample grounds for the imposition of discovery sanctions." Id. This 
Court should therefore disregard Plaintiffs claim that Defendant should have conferred 
in good faith prior to seeking an order from the trial court striking Plaintiffs untimely 
designation of fact and expert witnesses. 
B. Defendant's Receipt of Medical Records Does Not Alleviate Plaintiff 
From Complying With the Requirements of Rule 26(a)(3). 
Plaintiff also erroneously argues that the trial court erred in striking her untimely 
designation of fact and expert witnesses because Defendant already had her medical 
records. This argument appears to insinuate that Plaintiff had substantially complied with 
rule 26(a)(3) and that perhaps Defendant suffered no prejudice by Plaintiffs failure to 
submit formal designations of witnesses. In Pete v. Youngblood, this Court addressed a 
similar argument and held the following: 
Formal disclosure of experts is not pointless. Knowing the 
identity of the opponent's expert witnesses allows a party to 
properly prepare for trial The failure to disclose experts 
prejudiced [defendant] because there are countermeasures 
that could have been taken that are not applicable to fact 
witnesses, such as attempting to disqualify the expert 
testimony, retaining rebuttal experts, and holding additional 
depositions to retrieve the information not available because 
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of the absence of a report. In sum, we agree with the district 
court that even treating physicians and treating nurses must be 
designated as experts if they are to provide expert testimony. 
2006 UT App 303 at Tf 15 (emphasis in original). Without these designations, Defendant 
did not know which witnesses should have been deposed. Consistent with this issue of 
prejudice, the trial court ruled that "[w]ithout fact and expert designations, Defendant was 
not required to depose all or even some of the individuals identified in Plaintiffs 
discovery responses." (R. at 430.) Thus, having Plaintiffs medical records did not 
alleviate Plaintiff from complying with rule 26(a)(3), and the trial court was well within 
its broad discretion in striking Plaintiffs untimely fact and expert witness designations. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Summary judgments present for 
review conclusions of law only, because, by definition, summary judgments do not 
resolve factual issues. Thus, [this Court] accord[s] no deference to the trial court, but 
review[s] its conclusions for correctness." McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). Based on this standard of review, this Court should conclude that the trial 
court properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In addressing Plaintiffs negligence claim, the trial court correctly noted that she 
could only prevail if she first established a prima facie case of negligence, which requires 
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a showing of causation and damages. Plaintiffs failure to designate any fact and expert 
witnesses prevented her from establishing these two elements of her negligence claim, 
requiring dismissal as a matter of law. 
A. Plaintiff Could Not Establish the Element of Causation in Her 
Negligence Claim. 
Under Utah law, a party must establish the element of causation in order to 
recover on a claim for negligence. See Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, 
Tj 21, 176 P.3d 446. "'[T]he causal connection between the alleged negligent act and the 
injury is never presumed and this is a matter the plaintiff is always required to prove 
affirmatively.'" Id. at U 21 (quoting Jackson v. Colston, 209 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1949)). 
"Although 'the question of proximate causation is generally reserved for the jury, the trial 
court may rule as a matter of law on this issue if there is no evidence to establish a causal 
connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation.'" Fox, 2007 UT App 406 at f^ 21 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
"In Utah, '[t]he need for positive expert testimony to establish a causal link 
between the defendant's negligent act and the plaintiffs injury depends on the nature of 
the injury.'" Id. at Tf 22 (quoting Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 2000 UT App 285, U 16, 12 
P.3d 1015). Thus, "where the injury involves obscure medical factors which are beyond 
an ordinary lay person's knowledge, necessitating speculation in making a finding, there 
must be expert testimony that the negligent act probably caused the injury." Beard, 2000 
UT App 285 at f 16. "In such cases, the 'testimony of lay witnesses regarding the need 
for specific medical treatment is inadequate to submit the issue to the jury.' It is only in 
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'the most obvious cases5 that a plaintiff may be excepted from the requirement of using 
expert testimony to prove causation." Fox, 2007 UT App 406 at \ 22 (quoting Beard, 
2000UTApp285attl6). 
1. Plaintiffs Injury Claims Fall Outside the Common Knowledge 
of Laypersons. 
In the present case, Plaintiff complains of injuries which fall outside of the 
common knowledge of laypersons, requiring expert medical testimony. In her 
Complaint, Plaintiff claims to have suffered from permanent injuries, including injuries 
to her neck, back, shoulders, and right wrist. (R. at 5.) In her Complaint, Plaintiff claims 
that she suffered "permanent physical injuries and serious impairments of bodily 
functions .. . ." (Id.) Plaintiff also claims to have necessitated a wrist surgery as a result 
of the subject accident. (R. at 321-22.) However, the evidence also shows that Plaintiff 
had numerous accidents in which she suffered losses of consciousness prior to the subject 
accident. Furthermore, Plaintiff was involved in a prior motor vehicle accident in which 
she claimed injuries to her neck, low back, in between her shoulders, shoulders, arms, 
hands, hips, legs, knees, feet, and chest, and also complained of headaches, dizziness, and 
nervousness/depression. (R. at 345-46.) Further complicating matters was the fact that 
Plaintiff first complained of wrist pain approximately seventeen months after the subject 
accident, representing a considerable delay in treatment. (R. at 348.) These complicating 
factors place this case outside the common knowledge of a layperson and into an area 
requiring expert testimony. Fortunately, this Court has previously addressed similar 
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situations and has held that expert testimony was necessary in order to establish the 
element of causation. 
In Fox, the plaintiff descended down some stairs in the Harman Building at 
Brigham Young University when she slipped and was unable to use her right leg. Fox, 
2007 UT App 406 at *{ 2. When the EMTs arrived, they observed that the plaintiffs right 
knee was swollen and had deformities on both sides of her leg. Id. at ^ 4. While 
assessing her, the plaintiff told the EMTs that "she felt her right knee go out as she was 
going down[,]" "that she fell down only one stair, that she had been previously diagnosed 
with osteoarthritis in her right knee, and that there was some missing cartilage in that 
knee." Id. at \ 5. The trial court subsequently dismissed plaintiffs claim based on her 
failure to provide expert testimony to establish a prima facie case of causation. Id. at \ 
14. 
In upholding dismissal of plaintiff s claim, the Fox court stated that plaintiffs 
claim "is not a case that is excepted from the requirement that a plaintiff use expert 
testimony to establish a causal link between the defendant's negligent act and her injury." 
Id. at \ 23. In support of this conclusion, the court explained that plaintiffs own 
admission that her knee "gave out" and that she had a pre-existing condition of 
osteoarthritis to her knee, "tied the cause of her fall to medical factors sufficiently 
complicated to be beyond the ordinary senses and common experience of a layperson." 
Id. Although the court recognized that the plaintiff "could testify that she descended the 
stairway, fell, and experienced pain, she needed expert testimony to establish her prima 
facie case of causation and to prevent the fact-finder from resorting to speculation." Id. 
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Likewise, this Court addressed a similar situation in Hall v. Steimle, where it 
dismissed the plaintiffs claim of negligence based on a failure to designate expert 
witnesses to establish causation. 2009 WL 2569266 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2009) 
(unpublished opinion). The plaintiff claimed that his injuries were different than the 
injuries complained of in Fox, and that they involved "medical damages within the 
common experience of a layperson such that expert witness testimony is not required to 
establish causation." Id. at * 1. In responding to this argument, the court stated: 
[Plaintiffs] negligence suit, while presenting different 
injuries and causation issues than those in Fox and Beard, is 
still not an obvious case. [Plaintiffs] negligence case is 
complicated by a previous diving injury in the summer of 
1998 or 1999 when [he] suffered whiplash because he dove 
into a shallow lake. On October 4, 2000, about two months 
before the motor vehicle accident, [plaintiff] presented to 
Anderson Chiropractic complaining of neck and back pain. 
In his complaint, [plaintiff] alleges that he suffered permanent 
neck and back injuries as a result of the motor vehicle 
accident. It is beyond the ordinary knowledge and common 
experience of a layperson, given the history of [plaintiffs] 
neck and back pain, to determine whether the diving incident 
or the motor vehicle accident caused [plaintiffs] neck and 
back injuries, permanent or otherwise. 
[A] jury would not, without resorting to speculation, be able 
to determine if [plaintiffs] neck and back pain was caused by 
the motor vehicle accident or the diving incident, or if the 
motor vehicle accident exacerbated a pre-existing condition. 
Testimony concerning a chronological relationship between 
the accident and [plaintiffs] neck and back pain is not 
sufficient, in this case, to establish causation. 
(Id.) (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 
Thus, like in Hall, a jury would have to speculate as to whether Plaintiffs neck 
and back pain were a result of the subject accident, or one of her many prior accidents. A 
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jury would also have to speculate as to whether Plaintiff may have suffered any 
permanent injury or whether she suffered an exacerbation of a pre-existing injury, issues 
outside the common knowledge of laypersons. Therefore, without any medical expert to 
establish causation of Plaintiff s complicated injury claims, Plaintiff cannot establish the 
element of causation, requiring this Court to uphold the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. 
2. Plaintiff Cannot Establish the Element of Causation Based on 
Her Own Testimony as an EMT or Dr. Chung's Testimony. 
Plaintiff argues that even if her untimely designated expert were not allowed to 
testify, that she could have established the element of causation based on her training as 
an EMT or based on Dr. Chung's testimony. (Appellant's Br. 7.) These arguments lack 
merit. First, Plaintiff could only establish that she felt pain as a result of the accident, 
limiting her testimony to a chronological association between the accident and her pain 
complaints. The only evidence submitted by Plaintiff as to her qualifications is a single 
sentence in her affidavit which states: "8. I was a licensed Utah Emergency Medical 
Technician and was trained to recognize and stabilize traumatic injuries resulting from 
motor vehicle collisions and other violent impacts." (R. at 369.) Based on this statement 
alone, Plaintiff could not have established that the treatment she received falling outside 
the areas of recognition and stabilization were caused by this accident. Nor is there any 
evidence that her training as an EMT provided her with sufficient knowledge to 
determine which treatments would have been appropriate or which treatments were 
associated with pre-existing conditions. In short, there is no evidence to suggest that 
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Plaintiffs training as an EMT was sufficient to replace that of a medical doctor or other 
qualified treating physician. 
Second, Plaintiff could not have relied on Dr. Chung's testimony because she did 
not timely designate Dr. Chung as an expert to support her claim. Without any experts to 
testify on Plaintiffs behalf, Defendant would not have called Dr. Chung as a witness 
because there would not have been any expert evidence for him to rebut. In short, 
Plaintiff should not have relied on Defendant to establish her own negligence claim. 
More importantly, without any expert to establish causation, Plaintiff could not have, and 
should not have, reached trial based on her inability to establish a prima facie claim for 
negligence. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs negligence claim as a 
matter of law. 
B. Plaintiff Could Not Establish the Element of Damages in Her 
Negligence Claim. 
In order to prevail on a negligence claim, a party must establish damages. Asael 
Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App 315,128, 193 P.3d 650. In addition 
to an inability to establish causation in this case, Plaintiff also cannot establish her 
damages without expert medical testimony, supporting the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment. 
In Beard v. K-mart Corp., this Court was asked to determine whether the trial 
court erred in allowing the jury to consider three surgeries that plaintiff had in relation to 
an accident where she was accidentally hit in the head by an employee who was 
attempting to start a lawn mower. 2000 UT App 285 at ^ 2-3. The plaintiff failed to 
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establish any expert testimony as to whether her surgeries were necessitated by the 
accident, instead claiming that such necessity could be assumed based on her testimony 
of the chronological association between her pain complaints and the accident. Id. at fflf 
12, 15-16. The court responded: 
In this case, the question is not whether the accident at K-
Mart caused Beard injury, but rather whether injuries 
sustained as a result of the accident at K-Mart required the 
neurological surgeries performed on Beard's neck and wrists. 
Beard was properly permitted to testify that the accident in 
the store caused pain and injury. The question as to whether 
such pain and injury resulted from the blow is within the 
common knowledge and experience of lay witnesses and 
could properly be submitted to the jury. What is missing in 
the evidence, however, is the link between the injuries 
suffered and the necessity of the surgeries. . . . Certainly 
whether the need for complex neurological surgery was a 
result of the accident at K-Mart is not within the common 
experience of laypersons. 
Id. at ^116 (emphasis added). 
Here, the Plaintiff could testify regarding the pain she experienced after the 
subject accident as this evidence is certainly within the common knowledge and 
experience of laypersons. However, as in Beard, Plaintiff could not establish the 
necessity of her wrist surgery because the need for surgery falls outside the common 
knowledge of laypersons. Thus, "[w]ithout the required expert medical opinion linking 
the injury to the necessity of the surgery, a jury would simply be speculating about a 
linkage that is beyond its knowledge and experience. The expert medical testimony 
merely established a chronological relationship between the accident and [plaintiffs] 
symptoms." Id. at ^20. 
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In addition to an inability to establish the necessity of her wrist surgery, Plaintiff 
also cannot establish the reasonableness and necessity of the numerous amounts and 
types of medical treatments she received. Plaintiff has not established through any 
evidence that her own experience as an EMT qualifies her to determine the 
reasonableness and necessity of physical therapy, chiropractic therapy, massage therapy, 
and acupuncture based on her pain complaints. Perhaps more importantly, Plaintiff 
cannot even establish that the amounts she was charged were reasonable. 
In short, Plaintiff cannot establish that the treatment she received was reasonable, 
necessary, and related to the subject accident, and therefore cannot establish her damages. 
Laypersons' common knowledge does not entail an understanding of any of these 
treatment modalities, whether the different modalities should be experienced 
concurrently, how many treatments are reasonable, whether the amounts charged are 
reasonable, whether any diagnostic studies are reasonable or necessary, or whether any 
surgery was necessitated by the subject accident as opposed to any pre-existing condition. 
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish damages, entitling Defendant to summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly granted Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs untimely 
designation of fact and expert witnesses and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court used its broad discretion in determining that Plaintiff could not designate 
fact and expert witnesses long after the scheduling order deadline had passed, and even 
after having three separate opportunities to do so. The record shows that the trial court 
had previously used its broad discretion in allowing Plaintiff to set aside the prior 
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dismissal of this case, even when the evidence showed that Plaintiffs counsel did in fact 
have knowledge of the order to show cause hearing. The trial court's decision was also 
based on the finding that Plaintiffs failure was not harmless in that it prejudiced 
Defendant's ability to defend against Plaintiffs claims and that Plaintiff had not provided 
any good cause for her failure to timely designate fact and expert witnesses. Thus, the 
trial court properly exercised its broad discretion in striking Plaintiffs untimely witness 
designations. 
The trial court also properly granted Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
based on Plaintiffs inability to establish a prima facie case of negligence. Specifically, 
without expert medical testimony, Plaintiff could not establish causation or damages in 
her case. Even if Plaintiff were allowed to establish a chronological association between 
the accident and her injuries, a jury would have to speculate as to whether the extensive 
treatments she received were reasonable, necessary, and related to this subject accident, 
and not to pre-existing conditions and prior accidents. The nature of these various 
treatments, along with their complicating factors, takes this case out of the common 
knowledge of laypersons. Thus, the trial court correctly granted Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
ADDENDUM 
Defendant has attached as an addendum the case of Hall v. Steimle, an 
unpublished opinion, for the Court's convenience. 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge: 
*1 Jonathan Hall appeals from the district 
court's order granting summary judgment in favor 
of Jason Steimle and dismissing Hall's negligence 
claim with prejudice based on Hall's failure to des-
ignate an expert witness on causation. We affirm. 
In a negligence claim, the plaintiff carries the 
burden of establishing a prima facie case, including 
proximate and actual causation of the injury. See 
Fox v. Brigham Young Univ., 2007 UT App 406, % 
21, 176 P.3d 446. "[S]ummary judgment is appro-
priate only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Crestwood Cove 
Apartments Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, H 10, 
164 P.3d 1247 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we 
review the district court's conclusions of law for 
correctness and give them no deference. See Grap-
pendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, % 5, 
173 P.3d 166; Blackner v. State, Dep't of Tramp., 
2002 UT 44,11 8, 48 P.3d 949. 
Hall asserts that the district court erred in de-
termining that Hall failed to establish a prima facie 
case of causation by not designating an expert wit-
ness. Hall argues that his injuries, unlike those in 
Fox v. Brigham Young University, 2007 UT App 
406, 176 P,3d 446, and Beard v. K-Mart Corp., 
2000 UT App 285, 12 P.3d 1015, involve medical 
damages within the common experience of a 
layperson such that expert witness testimony is not 
required to establish causation. Indeed, " '[t]he 
need for positive expert testimony to establish a 
causal link between the defendants' negligent act 
and the plaintiffs injury depends on the nature of 
the injury.' " Fox, 2007 UT App 406, «|1 22, 176 
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P 3d 446 (alteration in original) (quoting Beard 
2000 UT App 285, \ 16, 12 P 3d 1015) However, 
"[i]t is only m 'the most obvious cases' that a 
plaintiff may be excepted from the requirement of 
using expert testimony to prove causation" Id 
(quoting Beard 2000 UT App 285, \ 16, 12 P 3d 
101S) 
Hall's negligence suit, while presenting differ-
ent injuries and causation issues than those in Fox 
FN1 
and Beard is still not an obvious case Rather, 
Hall's negligence case is complicated by a previous 
diving injury m the summer of 1998 or 1999 when 
Hall suffered whiplash because he dove into a shal-
low lake On October 4, 2000, about two months 
before the motor vehicle accident, Hall presented to 
Anderson Chiropractic complaining of neck and 
back pain In his complaint, Hail alleges that he 
suffered permanent neck and back injuries as a res-
ult of the motor vehicle accident It is beyond the 
ordinary knowledge and common experience of a 
layperson, given the history of Hall's neck and back 
pain, to determine whether the diving incident or 
the motor vehicle accident caused Hall's neck and 
back injuries, permanent or otherwise 
FN1 The plaintiff in Fox ^ Bngham 
Young UmversiK 2007 UT App 406, 176 
P 3d 446, broke her leg after a slip and fall 
See id % 6 This court affirmed the trial 
court's ruling that expert testimony was re-
quired to determine whether the need for 
her medical treatment was caused by the 
allegedly defective stairs or the plaintiffs 
own arthritic knee See id ffl[ 23-25 
The plaintiff in Beard I K-Mart Coip 
2000 UT App 285, 12 P 3d 1015, 
suffered neck and wrist problems after 
being struck in the head and falling to 
the floor See id \ 2 This court determ-
ined that without expert medical opinion 
linking the injury to the necessity of the 
surgery, a jury would be speculating 
about a linkage that is beyond its know-
ledge and experience See id K 20 
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Although Dr Anderson, Hall's treating chiro-
practor, was designated to testify concerning any 
observable changes to Hall's neck and back condi-
tion before and after the motor vehicle accident, a 
jury would not, without resorting to speculation, be 
able to determine if Hall's neck and back pain was 
caused by the motor vehicle accident or the diving 
incident, or if the motor vehicle ace ident exacer-
bated a pre-existing condition Testimony concern-
ing a chronological relationship between the acci-
dent and Hall's neck and back pain is not sufficient, 
in this case, to establish causation See Beard 
2000 U1 App 285,H 20, 12 P 3d 1015 (determining 
that the trial court erred in failing to remove the is-
sue of causation from the jury, stating that "expert 
medical testimony merely established a chronolo-
gical relationship between the accident and [the 
plaintiffs] symptoms No expert medical testimony 
was received that the neck and wrist surgeries were 
necessitated by her accident") 
FN2 Hall also asserts that a genuine issue 
of material fact precludes summary judg-
ment Hall argues that there are factual dis-
putes as to when Hall began experiencing 
pain following the motor vehicle accident 
and as to the location, type, and seventy of 
the pain experienced after the accident 
Such disputes, however, do not establish 
causation in this case in the absence of ex-
pert testimony 
*2 The district court did not err in dismissing 
Hall's negligence claim for failure to present expert 
testimony on the element of causation because the 
circumstances and nature of Hall's neck and back 
injuries were sufficiently complex to require such 
testimony As a result, we affirm the district court's 
summary judgment ruling in favor of Steimle 
WE CONCUR PAMELA T GREENWOOD, 
Presiding Judge and CAROLYN B McIIUGH, 
Judge 
Utah App ,2009 
Hallv Steimle 
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